Courbet translated his socialist and democratic impulses to painting by creating radically equalized compositions and painting subjects of working-class and “every day” life rather than presenting grand mythologies or portraits of rich and powerful people. This is not to say his paintings were not “grand” or without mythologies of a more socialist kind. Burial at Ornans (1851) is a massive painting consisting of numerous portraits of Courbet’s fellow citizens (equalized at a funeral). Future paintings were allegories for the ups and downs of 19th century French revolutionary struggle.
Of his bohemian life, Courbet wrote in 1850:
In our civilized society, I need to live like a savage. I need to go far away from governments. My sympathies are with the people. I must speak to it directly, draw my knowledge from it, live by it. This is the reason for which I choose to embrace the great, independent, and vagabond life of Bohemians. (133)
The Romantic dialectic, observed by Michel Löwy, in capitalist culture was born of the contradiction between the pre-capitalist intelligentsia (trained to value things by their qualities) and rising capitalism (tending to value things by exchange and utility). Capitalism’s continued need for an intelligentsia (and artists) repeatedly recreates the Romantic dialectic. The material and “spiritual” needs of artists, throughout the utopian 19th and 20th centuries, pre-disposed artists to both Romantic and material opposition to capitalism.
Because artists are, as artists, “middle-class” in relationship to production, but middle-class speculators who come from multiple class backgrounds, who speculate less in terms of money than cultural valorization, they seek to carve out or participate in spaces similar to that of 19th century bohemia. These spaces are sites of ideological contestation and volatility.
This dynamic can be poo-poo’d by vulgar Marxists but it has been an organic aspect of capitalist culture.
(Fifth detour: socialists in Bohemia)
This is not to say it isn’t contradictory. Traverso writes:
In the works of Marx, Courbet, Benjamin and Trotsky, Bohemia appears as a place of revolt that tends to split into two antipodal camps, a revolutionary one, going from the July Monarchy to Surrealism, from Blanqui to Mayakoskski and Breton; and reactionary one, going from the Bonapartist circles in 1848 to the Italian Futurists, Céline, and fascism. Baudelaire, in between both, is witness to a revolt that has not yet found its way, and is likely to go in either direction. (142)
For example, as Traverso shows, Trotsky’s attitude toward bohemia shifts dramatically according to what he perceived as the immediate tasks of the socialist movement. As a leading figure of the Bolshevik government he tended to be somewhat hostile to bohemia. As an exile (before and after October) Trotsky led a bohemian life and was in large part sympathetic to his fellow bohemians.
A similar striking contrast exists between his defense of “aesthetic nihilism” in the texts of his last Mexican exile and the essentially pedagogical vision of art he defended in 1923 in Literature and Revolution, going as far to make a discreet apology for “revolutionary’ censorship. In his famous manifesto “For a Revolutionary and Independent Art,” written in 1838 with André Breton (and to which Diego Rivera added his signature), Trotsky launched the slogan “absolute freedom in art,” and advocated among all the revolutionary tasks in the field of intellectual creation to “establish and secure from the start an anarchist regime of individual freedom. No authority, no constraint, not the slightest hint of command!” (148)
We should be clear. While Trotsky responded to changing circumstances, when he did not favor absolute freedom for art he was simply wrong, perhaps turning the “necessities” of the Russian Civil War and post-revolutionary crises into virtues (as too many Bolsheviks were wont to do).
But Trotsky wasn’t the first to span these contradictions. Even Marx lived what could only be described as a bohemian life in London exile while, at the same time, pointing out the ideological limits of that milieu (144). Traverso quotes the report of a Prussian spy:
He lives in one of the worst and cheapest of the London districts. He occupies two rooms. Neither of them is clean nor furnished with any equipment in good state, everything is broken, torn to shreds, each object covered with a thick layer of dust. Manuscripts, books and newspapers, his wife’s sewing, handless cups, dirty towels, knives, forks, lamps, an inkwell, mugs, pipes, tobacco ash lie, next to children’s toys, on the same table. When you enter the room the smell of tobacco and smoke overpowers you to the point that you feel you are groping in a cave, until you get used to it and take care to move some objects in the haze… a three-legged chair... is offered to the visitor, but the children’s food has not been removed and you risk staining your trousers. But this does not embarrass Marx or his wife. You are welcomed in a most friendly way and are cordially offered a pipe, tobacco and the rest. Then an interesting conversation starts which makes up for all the domestic shortcomings and makes the discomfort bearable.
The Prussian spy’s final observation is key to understanding left-wing bohemian artists (at least the poor and working-class ones). The squalor is redeemed, for an (all too brief) moment, by intellect and art. But only revolution can truly overcome that squalor. Without the final redemption, without the utopia that redeems that squalor once-and-for all, the avant-garde of the 21th century turned away from both revolution and art itself. Many became dull managers of cultural signs, quislings for corporations and gentrification. And the better ones hate themselves.
6. Hegel and Left-Wing Melancholia: A Note
While Marxism was not deterministic it was marked by its origins, Hegelian and otherwise. For example, Marxism is not, as a theory, Eurocentric. But Marx’s writings are overwhelmingly focused on Europe. “To blame Marx for ‘Eurocentric’ views means, in some way, to blame him for having lived in the 19th century and for having inscribed his thought in the intellectual and epistemic horizon of his time.” (152)
Marx himself “warned against the transformation of the ‘historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophic theory of the general development, imposed by fate on all peoples, whatever the historical circumstances in which they are placed.” (153) But this did not prevent, as Traverso notes, the turning of Marxist thought into a “positivistic” philosophy, first in the 2nd International (led by its “Pope” Karl Kautsky) and later in the Stalinized Communist International (153).
Hegel’s mistaken approach to history cannot simply be corrected by “replacing” the “idealist” determinant for a “materialist” dialectic. (154) Hegel’s history problem, in other words, was not simply his idealism but also his (related) iron teleology. The idea of sequential progress could not survive in the era of left-wing melancholia (and opened up the left to one of the post-modernist’s favorite lines of attack).
7. Missed Encounters: CLR James and Adorno
Part of what saves the Marxist theory from the limits of its origins have been thousands of theorists and activists who have revised it. But these contributors, blinded by their own narratives or sectarian orientations, have not always successfully communicated with each other. We do not pretend to be immune.
A striking example from Traverso’s book is the section on the melancholic gazes of CLR James and Theodor Adorno. The latter focused on the totalitarianism (fascist and Stalinist) in Europe. The former on colonialism. Despite the symmetry between these two phenomena – the fact one could describe the barbarism of fascism as colonial practices coming “home” to Europe – the thought of these two Marxists (of different sorts) remains largely unconnected. Adorno and James met at least twice, but they were ultimately not meetings of the mind.
And yet, the affinities are there. Edward Said, Traverso notes, writes in Representations of the Intellectual, that the two were “’contrapuntal’ thinkers who rejected conformism and escaped canonical views,” and both “immigrated to New York in 1938, at the edge of the war, and lived in America until the advent of McCarthyism.”
Both were also, from different angles, convinced that the terror of fascism, the carnage of the death camps, were not an aberration from capitalism’s trajectory. They were woven into the very fabric of the system.
Here is the Martinican poet and communist Aimé Césaire in his 1950 Discourse on Colonialism.
People are surprised, they become indignant. They say: “How strange! But never mind – it’s Nazism, it will pass!” And they wait, and they hope; and they hide the truth from themselves, that it is barbarism, the supreme barbarism, the crowning barbarism that sums up the daily barbarisms; that it is Nazism, yes, but that before they were its victims, they were its accomplices; that they tolerated that Nazism before it was inflicted on them, that they absolved it, shut their eyes to it, legitimized it, because, until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples; that they have cultivated that Nazism, that they are responsible for it, and that before engulfing the whole edifice of Western, Christian civilization in its reddened waters, it oozes, seeps and trickles from every crack.
We might venture to say then, for today’s purposes, that any viable critical theory – be it literary or otherwise – needs to concern itself with the anti-colonial struggle. And vice versa. The links are there, but they must be emphasized, examined and explored. Particularly today when the lack of a viable alternative to capital and racism continues time and again to undercut our ability to see linkages between exploitation and oppression, hyper-consumerism and neo-colonialism. The historic rift that has historically caused “Western Marxism” and left-wing Third World liberationists to speak in different tongues is, ultimately, one that necessarily must be bridged.
So too must the different postures struck by Adorno and James in relation to culture itself. On one end Adorno, the lover of the classical and high avant-garde with nothing but disdain for the popular, on the other James, whose defense of popular culture’s redemptive qualities and its reality as a battleground for ideas presupposed to a degree that of Stuart Hall.
How might we then square James’ reading of Moby Dick with the world literature of today? Traverso provides an engaging summary of James’ Mariners, Renegades and Castaways, his exegesis of Melville’s high seas literary masterpiece, in which the monomaniacal Ahab becomes stand-in for modernity’s death drive, bringing down with him a crew from across the planet thrust together by the motions of accumulation and extraction. Most salient here is James’ observation that the same forces that drown the crew are also what force them together, to pidgin-ize their communications with each other, to find a method of creating something total out of worlds stacked roughly on top of other worlds.
There is no shortage of stunning literature pulling on these themes today. But so much of the praise and accolades showered (rightly, we should stress) on Zadie Smith, Edwidge Danticat, Junot Diaz, seem to elide the point. That in a world of constantly shifting and widening diaspora, in which migratory human beings become vectors of different worlds, there remains an urge – diverted but not stamped out – to discover the universal in the particular.
8. Missed Encounters Part II: Melancholic Spheres
For all the grace and urgency with which Traverso weaves the romantic revolution through art, literature and film, it is something of a disappointment that he does not do so with music in Left-Wing Melancholia. This does not weaken the book by any stretch. Nonetheless the absence points up many questions about the aesthetic and outlook of a modern left-wing melancholic searching for their springboard into a practical poetics.
For what makes music unique in relation to the other realms of creativity is its relationship to time, its ability through sonic dynamics to create a sharp awareness of when one is in relation to the immediate past and future. The musician is a funny kind of anti-hypnotist. They foster a specific mode of listening that plays on the listener’s awareness of what they are hearing now and how it relates to what came directly before as well as an anticipatory uncertainty for what will come next. It is, at least potentially, a reminder that the past necessarily must generate a future.
The list of iconoclastic or experimental musicians allied to revolutionary politics, who sought to use their peculiarly slanted relationship to time as a kind of social sensitizer, is long. And despite what Adorno may have thought of jazz, it is no coincidence that so many have come since the rise of that pillar of popular music without which virtually no modern sonic expression would be possible.
Gil Scott-Heron, Robert Wyatt, Patti Smith, Fred Ho, Mark Stewart, Cornelius Cardew. These are musicians who, in one way or another, create or created sounds prefiguring a future by reference to what had already taken place, looking backward not out of nostalgia but to create a tunnel for Benjamin’s “tiger’s leap into the past.”